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Abstract 
In September 1996, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund launched the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC). This initiative was endorsed by 180 
governments around the world as an effective and welcome approach to help poor, severely 
indebted countries reduce debt as a part of the overall poverty reduction strategy. Three years 
later, the initiative was enhanced to provide for faster, broader and deeper debt relief.  
Using a panel data fixed effect estimation, this study assesses the achievements of the first 
and second HIPC initiatives and explores further areas of intervention that might help the 
HIPCs graduate from debt rescheduling and achieve sustainable growth and poverty 
alleviation. Despite moderate achievements of the HIPC measures so far, this paper argues in 
favour of a HIPC III initiative. Much more relief is needed to link debt reduction to poverty 
alleviation if the expectations raised by the HIPC initiatives are to become reality. 
Keywords:  debt relief, indebtedness, governance, HIPC initiatives, panel data, poverty. 
 
 
Debt Position of Developing Countries and New Initiatives for Debt Reduction 
A Panel Data Fixed Effects Estimation of the Impacts of the HIPC Initiatives 
 
Nazaire Houssou1 and Franz Heidhues2 
 
1 The HIPC Debt Problem 
Since the debt crisis of the 1980s, the international financial community has been providing 
help to debtor countries in reducing their external debt burdens in order to foster growth, 
reduce poverty, and attain external viability. This assistance has taken the form of the 
provision of concessional financing from international financial institutions, debt relief from 
official creditors mainly in the context of Paris Club reschedulings and, in some cases, 
bilateral action by creditors. These measures have resulted in considerable success in 
alleviating the external debt burden of many middle-income countries. Many poor countries, 
however, continue to suffer from unacceptable levels of poverty and heavy external debt 
burdens due to a combination of factors, including inappropriate development policies, 
imprudent external debt management policies, lack of perseverance in structural adjustment 
and economic reform, deterioration in their terms of trade, and poor governance. This group 
of countries has been classified as Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs).  
In response, the World Bank and the IMF launched in September 1996, the initiative for 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)3. This initiative was endorsed by 180 governments 
around the world as an effective and welcome approach to help poor, severely indebted poor 
countries reduce debt as a part of the overall poverty reduction strategy. In addition, the HIPC 
initiative called for faster and broader debt release for poor countries that pursue economic 
and social policy reforms. In September 1999, the initiative was significantly enhanced to 
provide more debt relief to more countries faster (World Bank, 2002).  
About eight years after these new initiatives4 were launched, little effort appears to have been 
directed towards assessing empirical evidence whether the initiatives have had the intended 
effects on debt stock, debt service and poverty-reducing expenditures. Likewise, whether 
HIPCs have responded in a similar manner to HIPC measures remains unanswered.  
This study analyses the beneficial effects of the new debt reduction initiatives and their 
contribution to development. Specifically, we seek to answer the following questions: 
1. What have been the effects of the new HIPC debt reduction initiatives for debt stock, debt 
     service and poverty-reducing expenditures?  
2. Is governance a source of variability in response to HIPC measures? 
3. Under what conditions could the HIPC initiatives be more effective?  
                                                 
1 Email: hounaz@uni-hohenheim.de / hounaz7@yahoo.fr  
2 Email: heidhues@uni-hohenheim.de  
3 For a fuller description of the HIPC initiatives, see World Bank, 2003. 
4The framework of HIPC initiatives contrasts with traditional debt relief efforts in four major aspects: (i) it 
places debt sustainability as explicit objective; (ii) it is comprehensive, in that assistance is provided by all 
creditors; (iii) it is participatory as debt sustainability analyses which provide the basis for relief decisions are 
prepared jointly by the IDA and IMF, and the country concerned; and (iv) it broadens the performance 
requirements to include explicitly social criteria. 
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We hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 1. HIPC measures have not significantly reduced debt stock and debt service of 
HIPCs. Consequently, the debt positions of the HIPCs have not been changed significantly 
and the impact on economic growth in the future remains limited. 
Hypothesis 2. Poverty-reducing expenditures of HIPCs remain unchanged after implementation 
of HIPC measures. Therefore, the HIPC debt relief did not improve the potential for poverty 
alleviation.  
Hypothesis 3. The responses of countries to HIPC measures in terms of debt stock, debt 
service and poverty-reducing expenditures depend on factors such as: i) government 
effectiveness, ii) control of corruption, and iii) political stability. 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant theoretical and conceptual 
considerations, whereas section 3 describes the methodological approach used. Section 4 
presents and discusses the empirical results and section 5 concludes with policy implications. 
 
2 Theoretical and Conceptual Considerations 
2.1 Debt-Cycle Hypothesis 
In examining the HIPC initiatives, one has to look at the overall debt cycle in order to 
approach the HIPC debt problem.  We have to consider more precisely the different debt 
stages a country will move through on its way of economic development. Analysing the 
specific characteristics of every single stage in the debt cycle gives information about how to 
act in a certain situation of indebtedness. These considerations lead us to the debt cycle 
hypothesis which focuses its attention on five balance of payments situations and debt stages. 
The debt cycle hypothesis works with the most relevant economic indicators for capital flows, 
i.e. the trade account, the net interest payments, the net capital flows and the debt stock.  
Analysing these aspects with regards to direction and extent of international capital flows, 
leads to the following characterization of the five debt stages: 
 
Table 1        Characterization of debt stages 
Debt  
stages 
      1st 
Young debtor 
            2nd 
Mature debtor 
3rd 
Debt reducer 
          4th 
Young creditor 
5th 
Mature creditor 
C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
*Trade deficit 
*Net capital   
  inflow 
*Net outflow 
of interest 
payments 
*Rising debt 
 
*Decreasing        
  trade deficit   
*Decreasing net    
  capital inflow 
*Net outflow of 
interest  payments 
*Debt rising at   
 diminishing rate 
*Rising trade  
  surplus 
*Net capital   
  outflow          
*Diminishing 
  net outflow  
  of interest   
  payments 
*Falling net 
foreign debt 
*Decreasing trade     
  surplus, then deficit 
*Outflow  of capital at     
  decreasing rate 
*Net outflow of      
  interest payments,     
  then inflow 
*Net accumulation of   
  foreign assets 
*Trade deficit 
*Diminishing net  
  capital flows  
*Net inflow of    
interest payments 
*Slow-growing 
net foreign asset 
position 
 
 Source: Compiled from Heidhues et al., 1996 
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Observing the long term development of today’s industrial countries confirms the debt cycle 
hypothesis on a large scale with exceptions. With regards to developing countries, we have to 
distinguish different historical experiences. In the colonial period, some countries achieved 
current account surpluses and even became capital exporters, but most economies (especially 
oil-importers) remained in the first stage of the debt cycle. During the 1970s, many countries 
thought to be at the second stage running remarkable trade surpluses imported huge amounts 
of capital. Some of them then reached the third stage running remarkable trade surpluses and 
reducing net debt. However, others did not experience this desirable economic progress and 
fell into high indebtedness due to the rising capital inflows and the inability to slow down the 
increase of net debt. These countries have been classified as HIPCs, despite decades of implicit 
and explicit debt relief efforts.  
 
2.2 Framework of the HIPC Initiatives 
According to economic theory, the HIPC initiatives are expected to bring about a sustainable 
debt level, reduce the constraints on growth and alleviate poverty in HIPCs. The following 
framework is applied to analyse their impacts. 
 
           
 
Figure 1: Framework of the HIPC Initiatives 
Source: Own presentation 
 
This frame suggests that HIPC measures aim at reducing the debt stock and debt service, 
allow raising poverty expenditures in HIPCs and consequently effect positively economic 
growth, poverty, and inequality. The next section describes the methodology used to 
estimate the effects of the HIPC debt initiatives.   
 
 
Poverty ExpendituresDebt Service and Stock
HIPC Initiatives
Increase Economic Growth 
Decrease Inequality and Poverty 
(-) (+)
(+)(+) 
(±
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3 Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 The HIPCs and Data Collection 
The HIPCs for which HIPC debt relief has been approved at decision point are the main target 
group5 of the study. The flows of HIPC debt relief are available only for the World Bank and 
IMF. These flows represent about 40% of the total HIPC debt relief in net present value 
terms. The contribution of Paris Club and other creditors amounts about 60% of the total 
relief in net present value terms. Therefore, the total flows of HIPC relief are determined by 
computing the product of the flows of the World Bank and IMF and a factor of 2.5 (100/40). 
The main assumption of this method is that the terms of HIPC relief are comparable and its 
flows are delivered in constant proportion over time.  
Data on debt service, debt stock and poverty-reducing expenditures were taken from World 
Development Indicators, Global Development Finance (2004), and HIPC documents. 
Estimates of governance indicators were taken from Kaufmann et al. (2002).  
 
3.2 Analysis Methods 
The approach used in this analysis integrates the “before and after” approach and panel data 
fixed effect regressions with econometric models in order to quantify the changes that have 
occurred in terms of debt stock, debt service and poverty-reducing expenditures within the 
framework of the HIPC initiatives and isolate their causes as well. Since HIPC effects cannot 
be captured in one single year alone, we used the average values of debt service, debt stock 
and poverty expenditures over three-year periods before (1997-1999) and after (2000-2002)6 
the implementation of HIPC measures.  
Given the heterogeneity of HIPCs and the relatively short period of HIPC implementation, 
panel data allowing fixed group effects estimation was formulated to isolate the impacts of 
HIPC debt relief. Panel data sets are more oriented toward cross-section analyses; they are 
wide, but typically short. Even though modelling in this setting calls for some complex 
stochastic specifications (Greene, 2003); a panel analysis (cross sectional-time series) offers a 
better framework for analysing the HIPCs. The fixed group effects approach appears to be the 
most appropriate for the questions under research. 
Interaction factors between the HIPC debt relief and three governance indicators (Political 
Stability, Government Effectiveness and Control of Corruption) were introduced in the 
model. The idea is that we may expect high beneficial effects in HIPCs with improved 
governance records. Therefore, creditors’ institutions may be interested in promoting such 
factors in order to establish an environment conducive to debt relief initiatives in the future. 
                                                 
5 For a complete list of HIPCs, see appendix 1. 
6 Even though the HIPC initiatives were launched in 1996, The World Bank (2003) reports that the situation until 
late in 2000 largely reflects the pre-HIPC relief because many countries did not reach their decision point at that   
time. Therefore, we use year 2000 as the reference. 
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Correlation analyses using time series for selected Middle Income Countries and HIPCs7 were 
performed to test if there is a correlation between debt level and growth and debt service level 
and growth. To make sure that the data represent a meaningful pattern, they were screened for 
missing values and outliers’ cases. The Democratic Republic of Congo and Sao Tome and 
Principe were removed from the datasets due to incomplete records. 
Finally, governance estimates were charted to explore whether they have improved under the 
HIPC initiatives. Estimations of the model8 and statistical analyses were performed using 
EXCEL and three econometric packages: LIMDEP, SAS, and SPSS. 
The various models used in this study have their merits and limitations. In bringing them 
together, we intend to highlight their differences, identify complementarities as well as 
indicate needs for further research. Despite methodological limitations, findings show a 
meaningful and relevant pattern that could not be set aside.  
 
4 Results and Discussions 
The empirical results suggest that the HIPC initiatives have had significant effects on debt stock 
and debt service. Likewise, the initiatives have had an indirect, but small effect on poverty-
reducing expenditures through debt service reduction. Much of the changes reported in poverty-
reducing expenditures, however, are due to aid and most probably to other factors. A thorough 
investigation of these factors requires another set of approaches which goes beyond the scope of 
this study. Good governance is also found to strengthen the effects of debt relief. 
This section reports the main findings of the study. The relationships between debt and 
economic growth are discussed. We then present the governance patterns of HIPCs under the 
HIPC initiatives. Finally, the results of the model are revealed.  
 
                                                 
7 Most of the HIPCs also belong to the group of Low Income Countries of the World Bank (2003).  
8 For a full description of the model, see appendix 2. 
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4.1 External Debt, Debt Service and Economic Growth 
Table 2 shows the statistical results for the correlation between debt level and economic 
growth for selected HIPCs and Middle Income Countries (MICs). 
 
  Table 2              Spearman correlation test for selected HIPCs and MICs 
Debt Service and Growth Debt Stock and Growth Variables 
Countries Coefficient Time Series Coefficient Time Series 
Benin .0129ns 1974 -2002 -.007ns 1974 -2002 
Bolivia -.547*** 1976 -2002 -.546*** 1976 -2002 
Cameroon -.321ns 1977-1995 -.470** 1977-2002 
Ethiopia -.032ns 1982-2002 .225ns 1982-2002 
Ghana -.334ns 1976-2002 -.289ns 1970-2002 
Honduras -.023ns 1974-2002 -.189ns 1970-2002 
Kenya -.020ns 1970-2002 0.248ns 1975-2002 
Mali -.243ns 1975-2002 -.032ns 1970-2002 
Senegal -.149ns 1974-2002  -.021ns 1970-2002 
  
H
IP
C
s 
Tanzania -.464** 1989-2002 -.569** 1989-2002 
Algeria -.618*** 1977-1991 -.335** 1970-2002 
Brazil -.084ns 1975-2002 -.135ns 1975-2002 
China -154ns 1982-2002 .543** 1987-2002 
Egypt .36ns 1977-2002 .350** 1970-2002 
Guatemala -.300ns 1978-2002 -.518*** 1970-2002 
Philippines -.143ns 1977-2002 -.451*** 1970-2002 
Romania -.065ns 1981-2002 .511** 1990-2002 
South Africa -.700ns 1994-2001 -.200ns 1994-2001 
Thailand -.360** 1975-2002 -.264ns 1970-2002 
 
M
IC
s 
Turkey -.225ns 1976-2000 .036ns 1976-2000 
Source: Own computations; data from GDF, WDI and HIPC documents, 2004. 
Note: *** (**) (*) indicates 1% (5%) and (10%) significance level.  ns denotes not significant. 
 
As indicated in Table 2, for most countries in the sample, debt stock and debt service affect 
economic growth negatively although in quite a number of them, the link is not shown to be 
significant. Furthermore, the coefficients are statistically significant for some of these countries. 
These figures show that external debt stock and debt service can be burdens for economic growth. 
The results are consistent with Karagol (1999), Metwally and Tamaschke (1994), and Were (2001). 
Unexpectedly, China, Romania and Egypt display a positive and significant correlation between debt 
stock and economic growth. This result suggests that whether debt is a burden for economic growth 
also depends on factors such as proper use of resources and economic and political management. It 
indicates that proper management of external resources is important to spur economic growth.  
As concerns HIPCs, empirical evidence confirms the theoretical assumption, suggesting that the 
improvement in their debt positions, that is a reduction of debt stock and debt service levels, may 
help economic growth and poverty alleviation in the future, but that need not necessarily be the case. 
Especially for those developing countries that do not meet their debt service obligations or where 
the relief is made on debt which is not serviced, the effects will not show up, at least not in the short 
to medium term. In the long run, these countries may find their access to new credits impaired.
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4.2 Country Governance under the HIPC Initiatives 
Good governance is essential to the success of the HIPC initiatives. The World Bank and the 
IMF (2003) report that the current framework is fully supportive of good governance policies 
and includes related conditions and indicators. The initiatives form a broader effort by the 
international community to support improvement in governance in these countries.  
In the following figures, we examine the trends of three governance criteria9 within the period 
of HIPC debt relief. These figures describe the frequency (number of HIPCs in percent) that 
have improved or worsened their governance indicator compared to the previous period. With 
this, we wish to express the efforts made by HIPCs as a group to improve their performances 
while receiving debt relief. 
 
Source: Own computations; data from Kaufmann et al., 2002. Frequencies refer to the number of HIPCs  
that have improved or worsened their governance indicators  compared to the previous period. 
 
Figure 2 shows that in 1998, 74% of HIPCs have improved their performances compared to 
1996; that is the beginning of HIPC initiatives. However, this number has significantly 
declined in the subsequent years. Many HIPC effectiveness estimates have worsened.  
As concerns the political stability indicator (Figure 3), it shows practically no change in the 
estimates from 1996 to 2002. 
                                                 
9 The definitions of governance indicators are given in appendix 3. 
Figure 3: Pattern of Political Stability in HIPCs 
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 Source: Own computations; data from Kaufmann et al., 2002. 
 
Estimates of the frequency of the control of corruption indicator (Figure 4) display a 
sinusoidal trend, reflecting the very volatile influence of HIPC governments on corruption.  
The question that arises from the above discussion is: Have the HIPCs improved their 
governance under the HIPC initiatives? The answer is no. Apart from political stability for 
which no sensible change is reported, both of the others governance indicators 
show a substantial decline.  
Overall, it seems fair to say that HIPCs have displayed worse governance indicators despite 
the waves of HIPC debt relief, with an average falling below the world average in every 
single period. Yet good governance has been emphasized as a key factor for the success of the 
initiatives. This is not to imply that HIPCs are worse than other developing countries in terms 
of governance; many of them are making serious efforts to improve their governance instead.   
Figure 4: Pattern of Corruption Control  in HIPCs
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4.3 Modelling the Effects of the HIPC Initiatives 
An important question of this research is to ascertain whether the HIPC initiatives have had an 
impact on debt indicators and poverty-reducing expenditures. In addition, the role played by three 
important governance indicators in HIPC responses was examined. We investigate all these issues 
using a variety of methods. The most important results are reported in this sub-section. 
 
Table 3   Wilcoxon signed ranks test for debt stock, debt service and poverty-reducing  
                expenditures of HIPCs 
 MDST2 – MDST110 MDSR2 – MDSR111 MPEXP2 – MPEXP112 
Z-obs -1.251ns -3.200*** -3.528*** 
p-value .211 .001 .000 
Source: Own computations; data from GDF, WDI and HIPC documents, 2004.                                    
Note: *** (**) (*) indicates 1% (5%) and (10%) significance level.  ns denotes not significant. 
 
From Table 4.2, it appears that there are highly significant differences between the debt 
service and poverty-reducing expenditures before and after the HIPC initiatives, indicating 
that debt relief is primarily affecting the flow variables such as here debt service and 
government expenditures for poverty reduction.  
Such differences could not be established for the external debt stock indicator. In other words, 
the analyses suggest that debt service has been significantly reduced; poverty expenditures 
have been significantly increased, whereas the stock of external debt remains the same.  
These results are broadly plausible. However, many factors interact in the economies of 
HIPCs, and it is not possible to systematically attribute the observed changes directly to the 
HIPC measures. The reason is that the approach used fails to separate the changes due to 
HIPC measures from other factors. 
The above analysis, however, has the merit of giving a first insight into the impacts of the 
HIPC debt relief. Interestingly, while there is still no evidence of the effects of the HIPC 
initiatives, this discussion does answer partly the first and second hypothesis. The next part 
of the section quantifies the specific effects of HIPC debt relief. 
 
 Results of the Model Estimation  
As stated earlier, panel data allowing fixed group effects estimation was used, given the 
heterogeneity across HIPCs and the relatively short period of implementation of the HIPC 
initiatives. The model is described in appendix 2. No co-linearity was found between 
variables in the model, as values of estimated correlation coefficients were far below 0.8. The 
Hausmann specification tests give a mixed picture of the statistical significance of the fixed 
over the random effects models. Considering the above theoretical discussions, all three 
equations were estimated using the fixed effects model. 
 
                                                 
10 External Debt Stock before and after the HIPC initiatives 
11 Debt Service before and after the HIPC initiatives 
12 Poverty-Reducing Expenditures before and after the HIPC initiatives 
  12
The results of the model, including some classical statistics, are reported in Table 4. 
They show a puzzling and seemingly contradictory result. 
 Table 4       Estimation of the panel model coefficients (Fixed effects are available  
                     upon request) 
                        N=100 Observations 
One-Way Fixed Effect Model 
EDT DSR PEXP 
 
Variables13 
Debt Stock Equation Debt Service Equation Poverty Expenditures Equation 
EDT 
DSR 
PEXP 
HIPC 
AGRO 
GDPG 
POL 
CTR 
GOV 
GRC 
IIL 
INF 
GRNE  
EBG 
AID 
DEP 
-0.30ns  (-0.86) 
1.175ns   (0.97) 
-3.928***  (-3.01) 
0.390**    (2.28) 
-.870ns   (-1.35) 
-21.950** (-2.16) 
-5.742ns   (-0.82) 
21.339*  (-1.87) 
0.663ns      (1.46) 
1.960***  (3.45) 
 
-0.029ns   (-0.723) 
DEP 
-0.534ns (-1.320) 
-2.228*** (-5.609) 
0.063ns (1.072) 
-0.098ns (-0.457) 
0.392ns   (0.108) 
-0.884ns  (-0.355) 
-1.871ns (-0.448) 
 
 
-0.276**  (-2.076) 
 
 
 
0.11ns   (1.035) 
-0.069**    (-2.275) 
DEP 
-0.134ns    (-1.114) 
-0.001ns    (-0.91) 
 
9.50ns (1.133) 
-0.508ns (-0.827) 
-0.958ns (0.992) 
 
 
 
-0.485***  (-6.052) 
-0.489***   (-5.663) 
0.129***   (3.281) 
Hausmann Statistic 33.10*** 12.40ns 13.96ns 
Adjusted R-squared 94% 64% 87% 
Model test F [ 34, 62]=  47.99*** [ 32,  60] =  6.17*** [34,  62] = 20.15*** 
Source: Own computations; data from Kaufmann et al., 2002; GDF, WDI, and HIPC documents, 2004. 
Note: *** (**) (*) indicates 1% (5%) and (10%) significance level.  ns denotes not significant. t- values in brackets. 
 
                                                 
13 EDTit= External Debt Stock (in percent of gross domestic product) of the ith-country in year t                        
DSRit=Debt Service Ratio (in percent of exports of goods and services) of the ith-country in year  
PEXPit=Poverty Expenditures (in percent of gross domestic product) of the ith-country in year t                    
HIPCit = HIPC debt relief (in percent of gross domestic product) of the ith-country in year t                            
INFit = Inflation rate (consumer price) of the ith-country in year t                                                                
AGROit = Annual growth of export of goods and services (%) of the ith-country in year t                          
GDPGit = Annual growth of gross domestic product (%) of the ith-country in year t                                      
GRNEit = Gross national expenditures (in percent of gross domestic product) of the ith-country in year t              
GRCit = Gross capital formation (in percent of gross domestic product) of the ith-country in year t                     
EBGit = External balance on export of goods and services of the ith-country in year t                                                 
AIDit = Aid (in percent of gross national income) of the ith-country in year t                                                                 
IILit = IBRD and IDA loans (in percent of gross domestic product) of the ith-country in year t                                  
CTRit = Control of corruption index of the ith-country in year t                                                                                
GOVit = Government effectiveness index of the ith-country in year t                                                                                
POLit = Political stability index of the ith-country in year t 
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From the debt stock equation, most of the results support expectations in terms of the sign of the 
coefficients (poverty expenditures, growth rate of exports of goods and services, gross capital 
formation, IBRD and IDA loans, HIPC debt relief, growth rate of GDP, control of corruption and 
political stability). The sign for the growth rate of exports of goods and services, government 
effectiveness and debt service, however, were not expected. Moreover, the coefficients for the 
growth rate of exports of goods and services and government effectiveness are significant. It may 
be explained that countries with promising exports potential and high government effectiveness 
tend to obtain more foreign loans that culminate in larger external debt. The higher the growth 
rates of exports, the higher the country’s ability to borrow from abroad.  
This reduces the uncertainty from the country’s side to meet its debt service obligations in the 
future and increases its creditworthiness vis-à-vis creditors’ institutions. Likewise, HIPCs 
with higher government effectiveness indicator have high debt stock. More effective 
governments tend to attract more funds and use them well. It is interesting to note that loans 
are highly significant; the higher the loan, the higher the debt stock. 
More importantly, the HIPC debt relief is negative and highly significant. Clearly, this result 
indicates that the HIPC debt relief has an impact on the debt stock of the HIPCs for the period 
1996-2002. However, these impacts are modest. A one percent increase in HIPC relief is 
associated with about four percent debt stock reduction. Surprisingly, while HIPC debt relief 
has impact on debt stock, the flow of new loans seems to have diluted these effects. The 
HIPCs have borrowed from abroad during the same period - probably because of the reduced 
debt overhang effect and improved creditworthiness following the debt stock reduction. This 
explains why their debt stock has not changed, as discussed earlier in this section. Such 
evidence goes in the same direction as Easterly’s hypothesis. These results are also similar to 
those of Dijkstra and Hermes (2001b) who report that the stock effect of debt reduction in 
Latin American Countries has translated into improved creditworthiness for these countries. 
As concerns the debt service equation, apart from debt stock, growth rate of exports of goods 
and services and political stability, all of the variables have the hypothesized signs. Inflation 
is found to be negative and highly significant. This may be due to the fact that when inflation 
is higher, HIPCs lack resources to service their debt.  
Likewise, estimation results strongly suggest that HIPC debt relief did significantly and 
negatively affect debt service for the period 1996-2002. A one percent increase in HIPC debt 
relief reduces the debt service by about two percent. This implies that the HIPC debt relief is 
significantly associated with the debt service reduction observed earlier. Unlike the debt 
stock, the debt service of HIPCs was reduced during the period of study. 
As concerns the poverty expenditures equation, most of the results conform to the theoretical 
analysis. Debt stock and HIPC debt relief have unexpected signs, but neither of them is significant. 
It is interesting to note that debt service is indeed significant and negative. This indicates that the 
service of debt at its current level is still a burden for poverty reduction. These results suggest that 
the increase in poverty expenditures reported earlier is not directly due to HIPC debt relief, but to 
others factors. It was expected that a significant and positive relationship between HIPC debt relief 
and poverty expenditures would be the case. The HIPC debt relief was considered as assistance to 
HIPCs and was supposed to be used for social purposes. However, HIPC initiatives did have an 
indirect effect on poverty expenditures through debt service reduction.  
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On the other hand, aid has a positive and significant impact on poverty expenditures in the 
estimation, suggesting that aid also contributes to poverty expenditures. 
The official expectations were that resources would be freed from the HIPC relief and used to 
boost poverty expenditures. Empirical evidence supports the fact that few resources have been 
freed through the effect of debt relief on debt service. HIPC relief appears mainly to be an 
operation of book keeping. Going back to the origin of the HIPC initiatives, the debt level of 
HIPCs was believed to be unsustainable and they still do not possess enough resources to 
meet their debt service obligations. No significant resource should, therefore, be expected 
from the relief because these resources simply do not exist. The potential effects of HIPC 
initiatives seem to have been overestimated. These results are consistent with recent studies.  
In the Latin American experience, Dijkstra and Hermes (2001b) postulate that a flow effect of 
debt relief was difficult to establish in the presence of large arrears. Likewise, Birdsall et al. 
(2001) have reported that the HIPC relief is too small to meet the needs of HIPCs. 
Similar views are expressed by Mbelle (2001) in the case of Tanzania, and Martin (2002) 
referring to the Millennium Development Goals. 
As a whole, there seem to be strong arguments for the effects of HIPC initiatives only with 
respect to debt stock and debt service. Estimated results indicate that the impact of HIPC debt 
relief on poverty expenditures is little. Surprisingly, the flows of new loans have cancelled 
out the stock effect of HIPC measures. It appears, therefore, that the effects of 
indebtedness have been weakened, but certainly the causes have not been removed.  
This raises the question of the sustainability of debt reduction. Is it likely that debt reduction 
would be sustainable when the HIPCs continue to borrow from international institutions while 
receiving relief? The answer to this question is: it depends. Whether new borrowings end up 
being beneficial or harmful to HIPCs does depend upon how well these resources are used.  
However, given the history of HIPCs, there are serious reasons to be sceptical. The problems 
seem to have been postponed to the future and there is still no convincing evidence that 
HIPCs are on the right track. 
 
 Determinants of HIPC Responses 
Three governance dimensions, political stability, control of corruption and government 
effectiveness, were introduced as interaction factors in the above equations to determine whether 
good governance is a source of variability and thereby answering the question whether HIPCs 
have responded in a similar manner to HIPC measures. The results are reported in Table 5.  
 
Table 5                   Estimation of the interaction coefficients  
One-Way Fixed Effect Model 
EDT DSR PEXP 
Dependent Variables 
 
Interaction Terms Debt Stock Equation Debt Service Equation Poverty Expenditures Equation 
HIPC*POL 
HIPC*CTR  
HIPC*GOV 
-0.817ns (-0.31) 
-6.353** (-1.98) 
0.797ns (0.21) 
2.839***  (3.716) 
-0.455ns   (-0.466) 
-0.788ns  (-0.681) 
-.253ns (-1.087) 
-0.235ns (-0.778) 
0.502ns (1.580) 
Source: Own computations; data from Kaufmann et al., 2002; GDF, WDI, and HIPC documents, 2004.  
Note: *** (**) (*) indicates 1% (5%) and (10%) significance level.  ns denotes not significant. t- values in brackets. 
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Two interaction factors have the expected negative sign in the debt stock equation. The third 
interaction factor is positive, but it is not significant. The same is true for the debt service equation.   
In this case, however, the interaction factor with the unexpected sign is highly significant.  
As to the poverty expenditures equation, only one coefficient has the expected positive sign, 
but none of the interaction terms are significant.  
The above analysis does not allow drawing firm conclusions; it may indicate that the control 
of corruption and political stability indicators are important determinants of the debt stock and 
debt service effects of HIPC relief respectively. 
The first interaction factor14 suggests that the effect of HIPC relief on debt stock depends on the 
corruption level. For HIPCs with a high level of corruption, the stock effect of debt relief is 
small and vice-versa. In others words, the corruption indicator is a powerful determinant of the 
magnitude of the impact of HIPC relief on debt stock. This evidence conforms to expectations. 
The second interaction term suggests that the effect of HIPC relief on debt service depends on 
the political stability level. Therefore, the political stability indicator appears to be a powerful 
determinant of the magnitude of the impact of HIPC relief on debt service. For HIPCs 
with relative political stability the debt service effect of debt relief is small and vice versa. 
Politically instable HIPCs appear to have benefited much more in terms of debt service. Such 
a result contrasts with expectations. This may be explained by the fact that the debt service 
ratio for HIPCs with relative political stability is lower and therefore, the HIPC relief granted, 
and consequently its effect are lower accordingly.  
The conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that large debt relief will be useful to HIPCs 
if they have made substantial progress in good governance, especially with an improved 
corruption indicator. In a good governance environment, debt relief would have a fairly strong 
effect on debt indicators. 
All in all, findings reported above provide a mixed picture of the effects of the HIPC 
initiatives. Moreover, this analysis reveals that not only debt relief is crucial, but also aid and 
loans are vitally important for the development of HIPCs. Concerning the data and 
methodological considerations, some issues need to be examined. The analyses above are 
based on observational, not experimental data. Therefore, a spurious correlation might occur. 
The use of fixed effects and multiple regressions, however, limits the risk for this type of 
problem. Likewise, having had access only to the most fragmentary data, the analysis here is 
of course only partial.  
 
                                                 
14 The directions of the interaction factors are reported in the table of appendix 4. 
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5 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The present study tries to analyse the beneficial effects of the HIPC initiatives. Its aim is to 
provoke additional thinking. In this section, we summarize the research questions and the 
main results of the study and discuss policy recommendations, as well as limitations and 
needs for further research.   
 
5.1 Answering the Research Questions and Testing of Hypotheses 
The original research objective was to evaluate the impacts of the HIPC initiatives. On the 
first research question, we would say that the HIPC initiatives did have some positive effects 
on debt stock and debt service of the HIPCs. Even though the relief provided under the 
initiatives is additional to the traditional debt relief, these effects however, are only moderate. 
Likewise, the HIPC initiatives have had little impact on poverty-reducing expenditures 
through its effect on debt service reduction.  
On the second question, one percent (1%) debt relief provided under the HIPC initiatives has 
reduced the debt stock of the HIPCs by about four percent (4%), the debt service by about two 
percent (2%), and has indirectly increased poverty-reducing expenditures by about 0.15%. As 
for the third question, the control of corruption and political stability indicators appear to be 
two major sources of variability in response to HIPC measures.  
Concerning the first hypothesis, evidence supports that the HIPC measures have reduced the 
debt stock and debt service of HIPCs. Therefore, this hypothesis can be considered falsified. 
The debt positions of HIPCs, however, have changed only in terms of debt service. The flows 
of new loans have maintained the debt stock at the same level.     
As concerns the second hypothesis, evidence shows that poverty-reducing expenditures have 
increased after implementation of HIPC measures. Consequently, the prospects for economic 
growth and poverty alleviation would likely be better. This hypothesis therefore, is falsified. 
The HIPC measures have had an indirect effect on poverty expenditures. Likewise, other 
factors such as aid have an impact on these expenditures as well.  
As concerns the third hypothesis, evidence corroborates that the responses of HIPCs in terms 
of debt stock and debt service depend well on political stability and control of corruption 
levels respectively. This hypothesis, therefore, could not be rejected. However, the 
assumption is falsified in all other cases and with regard to poverty expenditures. The above 
answers have important implications for both creditors’ institutions and HIPCs.  
 
5.2 Policy Implications 
To begin with, it is important to note that the problems facing HIPCs are complex and 
multidimensional. Therefore no solution could be expected to encompass every reality in 
these poor countries. In the light of the above discussions and results, certainly there can be 
no doubt that the HIPC initiatives have had some beneficial effects. However, the root causes 
and acute symptoms of indebtedness have not been removed. The debt service of HIPCs has 
been lowered, but whether this reduction has freed enough resources is questionable. There 
are two possible scenarios. Either significant resources were indeed freed, but directed 
towards other sectors of the economy in HIPCs, or there were little freed resources.  
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In the first scenario, creditors’ institutions have the responsibility to ensure that funds are 
effectively used for their intended purposes if the HIPC initiatives are to be a major 
breakthrough. At the moment, there are no effective mechanisms in place which ensure that 
assistance is used for social purposes. Therefore, actions have to be taken in this direction. If 
necessary, the assistance provided for the HIPCs that do not respect ex-ante agreed upon 
conditions could be suspended. This scenario is, however, unlikely given the eligibility 
requirements and the scrutiny that HIPCs have to go through to qualify for the HIPC relief.  
In the second scenario, the HIPC relief is probably not large enough to create significant 
resource flows to be used for social purposes and anti-poverty programmes. Therefore, the 
HIPC initiatives could miss the very goal for which it has been established. To prevent such a 
result, additional concessions are required from the donor community if the rhetoric 
surrounding the initiatives is to become a reality. This idea is not, in fact, a completely new 
one. Similar views are expressed in the literature, even though for different reasons.  
A minimum, but broader conditionality would be required. Debt relief without conditionality would 
probably be hazardous. However, in contrast to traditional conditionality that is tailored only to 
internal conditions prevailing in HIPCs, changes are also needed in the external environment.  
An increasing recognition that the HIPC initiatives alone cannot solve the economic problems 
in HIPCs points to the need for change in international cooperation and establishment of more 
rational relationships between the creditors and debtors nations. Many factors are 
interconnected and with an increasingly liberalized world economy, the emergence of the 
economies of HIPCs depends on how they can make use of a freer world market. With their 
heavy dependence on the world market, it is inevitable that distortions of all kind (subsidization, 
trade barriers, etc.) would adversely affect any growth effect of debt relief. Therefore, whether 
debt relief is beneficial should not be the concern of the HIPCs alone. Donors’ institutions have 
a great role to play in supporting HIPCs to get better access to the world market. 
If serious progress is to be achieved the concept of national sovereignty must be addressed. 
Often in the name of sovereignty, important questions about the success of the HIPC 
initiatives are left to the discretion of HIPCs themselves. We believe that a joint definition of 
poverty-reducing expenditures and socially-relevant sectors is necessary to insure an efficient 
use of freed resources. 
In this context, it is extremely important to emphasize the role the civil society and particularly the 
poor as major stakeholders should play; their views deserve greater consideration. Local 
participation should be encouraged to ensure the development of nationally–owned PRSPs. In the 
past, resources were neither targeted at the most efficient projects, nor at the poorest people or 
their real needs. In some cases, poverty-reducing projects attract the sympathy of the most 
powerful people within the poor, and the undermining or distorting influence of such individuals 
must be addressed. 
In a good governance environment, debt relief has a strong positive effect on debt indicators. 
Therefore, HIPCs with international assistance must make steady efforts to reverse the 
patterns of their governance at all levels. Larger share of debt relief should be targeted to 
countries with goor governance. Peer pressure should be emphasized on countries with poor 
governance in order to facilitate internal reforms. The New Paternship for African 
Development (NEPAD) offers a suitable framework for such role. With the waves of 
democracy across HIPCs, many governance-monitoring and especially anti-corruption 
institutions have been created. The HIPC initiatives offer a great opportunity to promote and 
empower these institutions.  
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To prevent further debt accumulation in the future which could again lead to debt overhang, 
lenders have to take account of the quality of governance in HIPCs. Likewise, recent 
proposals for an establishment of an International Insolvency Court, is one of the ways to 
tackle this problem. This could well exercise a disciplining influence on all participants and 
promote more careful borrowing and lending decisions.  
Mistakes may have been made and lessons learned from past experiences need to be taken into 
consideration in a HIPC III initiative. Much more could be learned if higher quality data were 
available. The improvement of the data generating systems of the HIPCs is important to yield 
high quality research and enable a better assessment of the impacts of HIPC measures. Likewise, 
additional efforts are required from all major institutions involved in the HIPC initiatives to report 
fairly accurate estimates of the current debt relief provided under the initiatives. However, the 
effect of debt relief is a long term process; success cannot be expeced overnight.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) 
 
Table 6           Grouping of HIPCs under the enhanced HIPC Initiatives. 
HEAVILY INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES (HIPCs) 
HIPC Relief Approved at Decision 
Point (27) 
Decision Point Not 
Yet Reached (11) 
CompletionPoint 
Countries (12) 
Potentially 
Sustainable Case (4) 
Benin                         
Honduras 
Bolivia                      
Madagascar 
Burkina Faso           
Malawi 
Cameroon                
Mali 
Chad                        
Mauritania 
Congo, Dem. Rep    
Mozambique 
Ethiopia                 
Nicaragua 
The Gambia       
Niger 
Ghana                
Rwanda 
Guinea               
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
Guinea-Bissau   
Senegal 
Guyana              
Sierra Leone 
Uganda            
Tanzania 
Zambia 
Burundi, 
Central African 
Republic 
Comoros 
Congo, Rep. of 
Côte d´Ivoire  
Lao PDR  
Liberia 
Myanmar 
Somalia  
Sudan  
Togo 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Burkina Faso 
Guyana 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mozambique 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Senegal 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
Angola 
Kenya 
Vietnam 
Yemen  
Source: Adapted from World Bank, 2003 
 
Appendix 2: Model Specification 
                          General Form of the Panel Regression Model: 
                              EDTit = f1 (HIPC, DSR, PEXP, IIL, AGRO, GDPG, GRC, GOV, CTR, POL, D) 
                            DSRit = f2 (HIPC, EDT, PEXP, INF, AGRO, GDPG, GOV, CTR, POL, D) 
                           PEXPit = f3 (HIPC, DSR, EDT, GRNE, AGRO, EBG, AID, GOV, CTR, POL, D) 
 
                     Functional Form of the Panel Model 
        N                
 EDTit = ∑ a0jDjt  +   a1HIPCit  +   a2DSR it   + a3 PEXPit   + a4IILit   +  a5AGRO it   + a6GDPGit   + a7GRCit  + a8GOVit                    
              j=1          +   a9CTRit   +    a10POLit   +  e1it          
      N                  
DSRit = ∑ b0jDj t  +  b1HIPC it  +   b2EDT it   + b3PEXPit   + b4INFit   + b5AGROit   + b6GDPGit + b7GOVit + b8CTRit        
     j=1          + b9POLit    +  e2it           
          N                
PEXPit = ∑ c0jDjt   +  c1HIPCit  +  c2EDT it + c3DSRit   + c4GRNEit + c5AGROit + c6EBGit + c7AIDit  + c8GOVit 
            j=1          + c9CTRit    + c10POLit    + e3it 
 
  22
Dependent Variables (03) 
EDTit= External Debt Stock (in percent of gross domestic product) of the ith-country in year t             
DSRit=Debt Service Ratio (in percent of exports of goods and services) of the ith-country in year t 
PEXPit=Poverty Expenditures (in percent of gross domestic product) of the ith-country in year t 
  
Independent Variables (12) 
HIPCit = HIPC debt relief (in percent of gross domestic product) of the ith-country in year t                          
INFit = Inflation rate (consumer price) of the ith-country in year t                                                                 
AGROit = Annual growth of export of goods and services (%) of the ith-country in year t                             
GDPGit = Annual growth of gross domestic product (%) of the ith-country in year t                                     
GRNEit = Gross national expenditures (in percent of gross domestic product) of the ith-country in year t      
GRCit = Gross capital formation (in percent of gross domestic product) of the ith-country in year t                
EBGit = External balance on export of goods and services of the ith-country in year t                                      
AIDit = Aid (in percent of gross national income) of the ith-country in year t                                                       
IILit = IBRD and IDA loans (in percent of gross domestic product) of the ith-country in year t                        
CTRit = Control of corruption index of the ith-country in year t                                                                        
GOVit = Government effectiveness index of the ith-country in year t                                                                  
POLit = Political stability index of the ith-country in year t 
 
a0j; b0j; c0j are intercept coefficients for the ith-country in each equation respectively.               
a1…..a10; b1….. b9; c1…..c10   are slope coefficients, common to all countries in the sample.            
e1it; e2it; e3it are error terms in each equation respectively.     
  
                                                   1 if   j=i 
Djt = Dummy variable corresponding to each country=                                                                                                        
                                                                                            0 if   i≠ j              
N= number of countries (27)                                                                                                                                    
i= country 
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Appendix 3: Definition of governance indicators 
 
The six main governance indicators are adopted from Kaufmann et al. (2002). 
 
Voice and Accountability includes in it a number of indicators measuring various aspects of 
the political process, civil liberties and political rights, measuring the extent to which citizens 
of a country are able to participate in the selection of governments 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence combines several indicators which measure 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown 
by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism. 
Government Effectiveness combines responses on the quality of public service provision, the 
quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil 
service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government's commitment to policies. 
Regulatory Quality instead focuses more on the policies themselves, including measures of 
the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank 
supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas 
such as foreign trade and business development. 
Rule of Law includes several indicators which measure the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of 
crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. 
Control of Corruption measures perceptions of corruption, conventionally defined as the 
exercise of public power for private gain.  
 
Appendix 4: Directions of interaction factors 
 
Table 7: HIPC responses for different governance levels  
Indicators Main Effect Interaction Coefficients              Range HIPC Responses 
Control of Corruption 
(Debt Stock) 
-8.343 
 
-6.353 -1.105 
1.100 
-1.323 
-15.331 
Political Stability 
(Debt Service) 
-1.596 2.839 -1.780 
0.710 
-6.649 
0.420 
Source: Own computations; data from Kaufmann et al., 2002; GDF, WDI and HIPC documents, 2004. 
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